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11 Introduction
Decisions, in which agents hold important private information related to the problem, are mod-
elled as games with incomplete information in the mechanism design literature. Although some
important parameters, e.g. private valuations or types, are not known publicly, in Bayesian
mechanism design it is usually assumed that the distribution of these parameters is common
knowledge.
A large list of mechanisms has been elaborated to cope with this kind of decision problems
in order to assure incentive compatibility, and induce truthtelling. One may choose among them
taking into account their theoretical properties and/or the assumptions that are required for the
results to hold. McAfee [1992], for example, studies the problem of a dissolving partnership in
which a set of indivisible objects has to be split between two parties when these are not informed
abouteachother’svaluations. Hepresentsthetheoreticalpropertiesofseveralmechanisms, such
asthe winner’sand loser’sbidauction orthe cake-cuttingmechanism, and ranksthemaccording
to ex post efﬁciency.
Jackson and Sonnenschein [2005] offer an interesting proposal for public decision problems
that operates without monetary transfers. They prove that the utility costs associated with in-
centive constraints decrease when the decision problem is linked with independent copies of
itself. The linking mechanism, or the social planner that runs it, relies on common knowl-
edge and forces reported valuations to match the commonly known true underlying probability
distribution that describes uncertainty in the economy.
Nevertheless, the general assumption of the known underlying distribution is quite demand-
ing in some situations, and therefore mechanisms may fail to extract private information. The
planner who runs the linking mechanism may encounter difﬁculties when announcing the rules
of the game, because in order to do so, she must know the entire underlying probability distri-
bution. One may argue that the prior distribution often can be approximated using some ﬁnite
sample. For example, as a ﬁrst step, the planner may undertake some (possibly very) costly in-
vestigation procedure in order to ﬁnd out the characteristics of a randomly selected small group
of people. Then, in the second step, based on these estimates she can operate some mechanism,
e.g., in particular the linking mechanism. However, distributions or high-order moments are
2difﬁcult to estimate with any reasonable accuracy.
Usually, probability density functions (pdfs) that embody total information about random
uncertainties are used to model uncertainty. In most practical real-world applications it is im-
possible to know or determine the pdf; so, we fall back on using the fact that a pdf is completely
characterized by all of its moments. For most pdfs, an inﬁnite number of moments are required.
In this paper, I propose a modiﬁed linking mechanism that relies on two moment conditions
rather than on all the moment; i.e., on the probability density function. The linking mechanism
with moments operates in situations in which a series of 0/1 type public decisions have to be
made. Result 1 can be interpreted as carrying out the discussed public project, while result 0
would mean to maintain the status quo. Uncertainty in this example appears if it is not known
publicly how effected parties value each and every public project. The linking mechanism with
moments requires that individual reports match the ﬁrst two central moment conditions. Using
exclusively the ﬁrst condition, the mean of the reported types equal to some constant, without
side payments would help to reveal whether an agent prefers building the project to the status
quo or not, but it would not give reliable information on the intensity of private valuations.
Agents would tend to exaggerate on the positive (or negative) consequences of the projects
and report the largest (or smallest) admissible valuation. Fixing the second central moment
of individual reports overcomes this problem, and allows for aggregation and interpersonal
comparison: a project is carried out if the sum of individual reports for it is positive. Also, in
practice the ﬁrst two moment conditions are frequently used to describe a distribution. Note that
if all the possible moment conditions are required to hold, we are dealing with the continuous
version of the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein [2005].
Since the number of decisions linked together would be limited in practice the linking mech-
anism can not induce truthtelling in general. Moreover, the linking mechanism with moments
merely imposes two moment conditions, and agents who participate in it can choose their re-
ports from a larger set of possibilities. Since the mechanism imposes fewer conditions this set
is larger than the set of admissible reports in the continuous version of the linking mechanism.
I show that under some conditions approximately truthful equilibria exist (equilibria in which
agents choose the closest admissible reports to their true valuations). In particular, as the num-
ber of decisions linked together and the number of participants increases, agents tend to choose
3their reports approximately truthfully. The rate of convergence of the linking mechanism with
moments is equal to the one reported by Jackson and Sonnenschein [2005].
Using only two moment conditions makes the mechanism useful in a wide family of deci-
sion problems. It allows for heterogeneity both among decision problems and agents, since a
large family of different probability distributions can match two given moment conditions. My
results, based on different versions of the central limit theorem, show that under some standard
assumptions heterogeneity does not spoil approximate truthtelling and efﬁciency. Throughout
the paper, Monte Carlo simulations offer numerical data on the proportion of (ex post) efﬁcient
decisions.
The linking mechanism and its version with moments can be related to a series of mecha-
nisms. For example, to the alternating selection mechanism studied by McAfee [1992] in which
two parties of a dissolving partnership take turns choosing among a set of indivisible objects
to be splitted up. In this case, the two alternatives in each decision problem are assign a given
object to one agent or assign it to the other. Note that if there are only two problems linked
together, two moment conditions restrict the set of admissible report to a pair, hence the linking
mechanism with moments works as a voting scheme. In case of more than two problems one
can see the mechanism as similar to the storable votes model proposed by Casella [2003].
Section 2 deﬁnes formally the linking mechanism with moments. Sections 3 through 5
present its theoretical properties, and ﬁnally, section 6 proposes the use of the linking mech-
anism with moments for an empirical problem thas has received the attention of academic and
industry researchers lately. Following the list of mechanisms studied by Erev et al. [2004],
I argue that assigning the right of way in air trafﬁc in order to avoid conﬂicts by the linking
mechanism may increase efﬁciency when compared to the actual practice. For more examples
and discussion on the related refer to Jackson and Sonnenschein [2005].
2 Linking with moments
Consider a set of agents who have to decide simultaneously over a number of 0/1 type decision
problems linked together. In this section I shall consider a situation with m decision problems
and n agents whosevaluations are modelled asindependent random drawsfrom the same under-
4lying probability distribution. This kind of symmetry is assumed for simplicity in this section.




m] represents how agent i values decision 1 in each decision problem; i.e.,
if project j is carried out agent i experiences a utility (increase) of xi
j units. The 0 decision
represents the status quo, and its value is now normalized to 0.1
Suppose that agents in the economy hold private information; or in other words, that xi is
not known publicly, but everybody knows that its values vary around a given central parameter,
µ, with a ﬁxed variance, σ2. Technically speaking, I assume that xi











= σ2 for all i and j, and that µ and σ2 are common
knowledge. Inordertoreachsocialdecisions, agentswillbeaskedtoparticipateinamechanism
that in what follows I shall refer to as the linking mechanism with moments:
Strategies Every agent is asked to choose a vector yi = [yi
1,yi
2,...yi

















0. In this case agent i enjoys a pay-off of xi
j, that otherwise would be equal to 0.
This mechanism is closely related to the linking mechanism proposed in Jackson and Son-
nenschein [2005]. The latter operates in the discrete case (though it is able to approximate the
continuous case), in situations in which the whole prior distribution that characterizes uncer-
tainty is assumed to be common knowledge (i.e. all the moments of the underlying distribution
are known). The linking mechanism with moments coincides with Jackson and Sonnenschein’s
proposal on the limit: when the number of applied moment conditions goes very large (inﬁnite).
Agents, who participate in the decision making through the linking mechanism with mo-
ments, are assumed to choose their reports as to maximize their expected pay-off, hence they
solve the following mathematical problem where M1 and M2 are the two moment conditions:







































with µ,σ2 < ∞. Since private valuations are treated as continuous random variables now,








= 0. In practice they can be















Even though the social planner’s principal objective in order to reach ex post efﬁcient deci-
sions is to extract the private information owned by the agents in the economy, truth might not
be an admissible message in the linking mechanism with moments, since true valuations might
not meet exactly the moment conditions. Nevertheless, by the law of large numbers, as the num-
ber of decisions grows, the absolute difference between the two sides of the moment conditions
diminishes, when agents report their true valuations. Taking part in the linking mechanism with
moments necessarily implies lies, therefore I concentrate on approximately truthful strategies
instead of truthful ones.
Deﬁnition 1. A message (strategy) e yi = [e yi
1,e yi
2,...e yi
m] is said to be approximately truthful
whenever it fulﬁlls the two moment conditions of the mechanism, and its distance from the
vector of true valuations, xi = [xi
1,xi
2,...xi
m], is the smallest. Formally, when
e y































Expected utility maximization and therefore Bayes-Nash equilibria in some cases may re-
sult in messages that are far from being truthful. I shall call a Bayes-Nash equilibrium ap-
proximately truthful if it involves approximately truthful strategies. The following proposition
delivers the condition that guarantees the existence of such an equilibrium for the linking mech-
6anism with moments.
Proposition 1. There exists an approximately truthful equilibrium of the linking mechanism
with moments, if the distribution function, F, that characterizes uncertainty is linear, or with
other words, if −
P
k6=i yk
j has uniform distribution.
Proof. Let F (x) = x−a
b−a for some a,b ∈ R such that a < b. Now the function to be maximized
















































j over the set deﬁned by





































































2 = const. This means that the distance
minimization problem can be transformed into the utility maximization problem and vice versa.
With the help of the above result it can be shown that as the number of decisions linked
together increases the vector of true valuations will be the closest point that fulﬁlls the two
moment restrictions. As for the rate of convergence, for the sample mean as an estimator of the













. 2 It is important to point out that for the above result (that applies the Euclidean
distance) to hold the imposed moment conditions must involve the ﬁrst two moments.
2For example, the book by Davidson and MacKinnon [1993] discusses these convergence concepts and offers
an introduction to asymptotic theory.
7The question of when the linearity of F is a reasonable assumption still remains open. The
following section discusses this problem, and argues that this is the case whenever the number
of agents (and with it the degree of the aggregated uncertainty) is very large.
3 Large economies
This section studies whether rational agents may consider F a linear function, or equivalently,
consider the corresponding density f constant. Let us apply the following measure for the
goodness of the mentioned approximation; i.e., the ﬁrst order Taylor approximation around µ:
Tol = max
y∈[ymin;ymax]
|f (y) − P1 (y,µ)|.
Note that even though individual messages must meet the two moment conditions, the support
of the admissible messages might expand. This means that as the number of decisions grows,
m → ∞, one can have ymin and/or ymax → ∞. Also note that, as the number of decision
problems linked together increases, the absolute value of the largest and smallest admissible
message (ymin and ymax) also increases. The following proposition states that as the economy
gets larger; i.e., as the number of effected parties and/or uncertainty grows, participants of
the linking mechanism with moments will tend to apply approximately truthful strategies in
equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Suppose that agents approximate the density of the others’ aggregated messages
with a constant, and the expected value of the underlying probability distribution is zero.
- If the number of agents and/or the uncertainty grow(s) beyond any limit, the tolerance func-
tions (i.e., the error made in the approximation) goes to zero.




















Proof. Without loss of generality let us consider agent 1 as playing against the other (n − 1)
agentsintheeconomy. Ifyi
j ∼ iiF withexpectedvalueµ = 0andvarianceσ2, oncewesuppose
that F has uniformly bounded third moments, we get that −
Pn
i=2 yi
j ∼a N [0;(n − 1)σ2].
Moreover, Berry [1941] shows that the error term of this approximation in the neighborhood of
8zero is of order n− 1
2. Note that messages sent by an agent are not independent since they are
requiredto meettwomoment conditions, butthe abovesumis overagentsand notprojects. This













P1 (y,µ) = f (µ) + f

























































2π (n − 1)
max
y∈[ymin;ymax]
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The maximization problem involves a continuous function, and note that − 1
2e < (n − 1)σ2




















Note that the maximization problem is solved at one of the extremes of the support. Without






































Let us check what we can state about the rate of convergence. If y∗2 is a ﬁnite constant, or tends































If the admissible messages can be any large, and y∗2 tends to inﬁnity faster than n, what we






. Altogether we have shown that the error term
in the approximation around zero of the density of a sum of centered iid random variables
with a constant is of order (n − 1)
− 1









By now it has been shown that as the number of participants in the linking mechanism with mo-
ments grows, the Bayes-Nash equilibria of the game tend to be approximately truthful. More-
over, as the number of problems linked together increases, approximately truthful equilibria
tend to be truthful. Therefore, the linking mechanism with moments delivers ex post efﬁcient
public decisions if the number of players and the number of decisions linked together tend to
inﬁnity.
Proposition 3. The linking mechanism with moments is asymptotically efﬁcient.
Proof. This result is a direct consequence of the previous proposition and Theorem 1 in Jackson
and Sonnenschein [2005]. The latter states that given a decision problem and an ex ante Pareto
efﬁcient social choice function, there exist a sequence of linking mechanism on the linked ver-
sion of the decision problem such that, (1) a corresponding sequence of approximately truthful
Bayesian equilibria exists, and (2) the sequence of linking mechanism with these corresponding
equilibria approximate the ex ante Pareto efﬁcient social choice function.
Note that if the linking mechanism with moments required all the moment conditions to hold,
we would be facing the problem discussed in Jackson and Sonnenschein [2005]. Since I cannot
give the explicit formula for computing the number of efﬁcient decisions, I have performed
10several Monte Carlo experiments in order to express numerically the asymptotic properties of
the linking mechanism with moments.
The situations I have simulated are the ones that arise when agents report their valuations
in an approximately truthful manner. Even though this happens only with a large number of
participants, or under some very special assumptions on uncertainty, I report results treating the
number of agents as a variable in the analysis.3 This helps to complete the picture.
4.1 The uniform case
In this exercise I assume that individual private valuations are generated by a random process,
precisely that they are drawn from the [−1;1] interval, and each outcome has the same likeli-
hood. Technically: xi
j ∼ U [−1;1] for all i and j. The problem that individual messages solve





















































































In order to eliminate the Lagrange-multipliers from the above system consider the equations for




































































3As shown in the previous section, for approximate truthful messages, the distribution of the others’ aggregated
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The following table reports the number of efﬁcient decisions for different values of m (num-
ber of decisions linked together) and n (number of agents). The computation has been per-
formed with GAUSS6.0 and 5’000 iterations have been made in each case. The last column, for
n = 50, can be interpreted as the one that approximates the theoretical case of large economies.
As predicted by Proposition ?? the proportion of ex post efﬁcient decision is an increasing
function of the number of decision problems linked together.
m  n 2 5 10 20 50
2 67% 70% 69% 70% 70%
5 83% 84% 83% 83% 83%
10 89% 84% 89% 88% 89%
20 92% 92% 92% 92% 92%
50 95% 95% 95% 95% 95%
Table 1. Proportion of ex post efﬁcient decisions in the U[−1;1] case.
124.2 Other distributions
Table 2 and 3 report result with similar pattern for different distributions. The standard normal
case is important, because it uses a distribution that play important role in theory, while the χ2
distribution has been chosen because of its asymmetry. The latter has been transformed in order
to have a centered random variable that is required for the results in this model.
m  n 2 5 10 20 50
2 66% 69% 68% 68% 67%
5 83% 82% 81% 81% 81%
10 88% 87% 87% 86% 86%
20 92% 91% 90% 90% 90%
50 95% 94% 94% 94% 94%
Table 2. Proportion of ex post efﬁcient decisions in the χ2(5)case.
m  n 2 5 10 20 50
2 67% 71% 69% 69% 69%
5 83% 83% 82% 82% 82%
10 88% 88% 88% 87% 87%
20 92% 92% 91% 91% 91%
50 95% 95% 95% 95% 95%
Table 3. Proportion of ex post efﬁcient decisions in the N(0;1)case.
5 Individual rationality
Individual rationality refers to participation constraints. A mechanism is called individually
rational if agents prefer to take part in it to asbtain from it. We talk about ex ante, interim and
ex post individual rationality depending on at which point of time is the participation decision
concerned.
As discussed in Jackson and Sonnenschein [2005], in the linking mechanism the ex ante
expected utility level taking into account the true private valuations; i.e., E [ui [g (xj)]] = u∗
j, is
reached on the limit that translates in our case into a situation in which the number of agents
and the number of decision problems linked together grow beyond all limit. The function g
represents an ex post efﬁcient social choice function.
In spite of this feature of the linking mechanism agents may want to abstain from participa-
tion, because the moment conditions imposed on reported valuations force them to pronounce
clearly in favor of some projects and against the others. Although not likely, but an agent
might happen to value negatively all the proposed projects and therefore prefer the status-quo.
Similarly to the linking mechanism discussed in Jackson and Sonnenschein [2005], the linking
mechanism with moments can be modiﬁed in order to induce individual rationality. For this a
13second stage should be added to the original mechanism in which agents decide whether they
wish to participate or not. If any of them decides not to, then no social decision is made and the
status-quo is maintained. Jackson and Sonnenschein [2005] show that the modiﬁed version of
the linking mechanism satisﬁes the ex post (with that also the interim and ex ante) participation
constraint. Since their argument holds in my set-up too, the proof is omitted here.
6 Heterogeneity
It is worth noting that the result for large economies holds in cases in which the distribution of
private valuations, F, differs across problems; i.e., when dealing with Fjs. This means that one
can link different decisions problems together without losing the appealing theoretical proper-
ties of the mechanism, as long as the underlying distributions behind the decision problems are
independent and not different in their ﬁrst two central moments.
Table 4 reports the results of a Monte Carlo experiment that simulates an economy with
two types of decision problems. One type has attached private valuations that are drawn from
a symmetric normal distribution, while the other are generated by an asymmetric χ2 distribu-
tion. Types have been assigned in a random manner: a given decision problem has the same
probability to be of type normal and type χ2. The random variables have been centered, and
transformed in order to have the same second moment. As predicted by theory, the pattern that
can be observed in Tables 1-3 is not altered by the presence of heterogeneity of the decision
problems.
Not only identical problems might be difﬁcult to encounter in order to link them together
and improve on ex post efﬁciency of the social decisions, but also effected parties, i.e., partic-
ipants in the linking mechanism with moments, might differ from each other. Fortunately, this
heterogeneity across agents does not necessarily invalidate my results.
The main result for large economies, the linearity of F on the limit, is based on the central
limit theorem that, in its classical form, holds for independent, identically-distributed random
variables. By Lindeberg’s theorem the assumption of identical distribution can be dropped and
the limiting distribution of the sum will still be the normal, as long as the so-called Lindeberg
14condition holds.4 Naturally, the linking mechanism with moments does not allow for all kind of
heterogeneity among agents, as it requires that the underlying distributions meet two moment
conditions and have ﬁnite variance. Precisely this makes the Lindeberg condition and with it my
results hold also under this type of heterogeneity.5 Table 5 report results from the simulations
according to which both agents and decision problems are heterogeneous: with probability 1
2
the private valuation xi
j is drawn from the χ2 (5)distribution, and with probability 1
2, it is a
realization of the N (0;10) distribution. Note that the proportion of ex post efﬁcient decisions
is barely affected by the heterogeneity.
m  n 2 5 10 20 50
2 66% 70% 67% 67% 68%
5 83% 82% 82% 81% 80%
10 89% 88% 87% 86% 85%
20 92% 91% 91% 91% 90%
50 95% 94% 94% 94% 94%
Table 4. Proportion of ex post efﬁcient decisions in the heterogeneous problems [χ2(5)&N(0;10)]case.
m  n 2 5 10 20 50
2 66% 70% 67% 69% 70%
5 83% 82% 82% 81% 82%
10 88% 88% 87% 87% 86%
20 92% 92% 91% 91% 90%
50 95% 95% 94% 94% 94%
Table 5. Proportion of ex post efﬁcient decisions in the heterogeneous problems and agents [χ2(5) & N(0;10)]case.
I have argued before that in practice agents and the central planner are likely to have precise
information only on the ﬁrst two central moments of the underlying distributions (means and
4See, for example, Billingsley [1995] for details.















j = 0 for all i and j.
It is not difﬁcult to show that the above condition is satisﬁed in this model, and therefore Lindeberg’s theorem
holds.
15variances). After considering the issue of heterogeneity in the model, a short comment is in
order: there exist a very large number of distributions that have some given expected value and
variance, therefore uncertainty is very complicated to perceive and also to model. In these situa-
tions uninformative (uniform) priors could be a reasonable choice by participants. As discussed
before, the linking mechsnism with moments with uniform priors leads to an equilibrium with
approximate truthtelling.
7 Practical example: the right of way in the sky6
Recent technological and regulatory developments in air transportation have raised a debate
about who is responsible for the adequate separation between aircrafts in the air and who should
maneuver to avoid conﬂicts. Current practice relies on a centralized system in which air trafﬁc
controllers execute this task. The changes under considerations allow for free ﬂight, and opt
for decentralization by proposing the idea of self-separation between aircrafts. According to
the latter, right-of-way rules should resolve conﬂicts and determine who has to undergo an
avoiding maneuver. The existing rules state that the right of way goes to the aircraft that comes
from the right or is in front, in case of overtaking. As argued by Erev et al. [2004] efﬁcient
right-of-way rules should take into account both technological and economic constraints, and
also consider strategic behavior among the potential parties of a conﬂict in the air. Current
regulation gives way to trafﬁc coming from the right, while economic efﬁciency requires giving
it to the party that values it most. Considering both rational and boundedly rational agents, Erev
et al. [2004] suggest a series of possible rules from the mechanism design literature based on
their theoretical properties. I believe that the linking mechanism with moments is a suitable
candidate to be included in this list. Its appealing theoretical properties have been shown in this
paper. It is simple, yet applicable in a variety of situations without the necessity of monetary
side payments. The lack of money eliminates the incentives to initiate conﬂict, and as discussed
below in this section, this mechanism increases efﬁciency in the conﬂict resolution.
The linking mechanism with moments can be tailored for this problem as follows. Airlines
6The problem discussed in this section is considered in detail by Erev et al. [2004]. They propose and discuss
a series of feasible solutions that the economic literature offers at the moment, such as the alternating offers
mechanism, negotiation with side payments and the sealed bid auction.
16(the affected parties or players in this game) are periodically asked to attach a real number to
every ﬂight due to take-off before the next reporting time. The length of the period between
reports should be determined as to ensure feasibility, relatively little operational cost to airlines
and a sufﬁcient number of ﬂights to be considered simultaneously, since the appealing proper-
ties of the mechanism require a large number of simultaneous reports from every player. The
number attached to ﬂight j by airline i in period t is yit
j ∈ R. According to the rules of the
linking mechanism with moments these numbers should meet two moment conditions in every
period, and in equilibrium they reﬂect how airlines value the right of way (the importance of
being on time at the destination) of the given ﬂight.7 Theoretical moments, in order to ﬁx the
restrictions, can be deﬁned by previously conducted throughout statistical surveys for every re-
porting period. Now, when two aircrafts enter in conﬂict the one with the higher attached value
receives the right of way, while the other must undergo an avoiding maneuver. Ties, although
being zero probability events in theory, can be resolved by a random device.
Proposition ?? and the numerical results in Tables 1 through 5 are the theoretical proofs for
how this mechanism would be able to improve efﬁciency in the right-of-way problem, whenever
the assumptions of the model hold.
8 Conclusions
The linking mechanism with moments has been presented for public decision problems. It is a
less demanding version of the linking mechanism from an informational point of view, never-
theless it keeps its asymptotic properties. The simpleness of its rules, the feature that it operates
without monetary transfers and its intuitive equilibria make the mechanism attractive for appli-
cations, although little is known about its performance in the ﬁnite world. The characterization
of its equilibria with a small number of participants may also help to explore whether the link-
ing mechanism is immune to coalitional deviations. The argument presented by Jackson and
Sonnenschein [2005] does not apply directly to this case, because coalition formation reduces
the number of participants.
The similarities and differences between using the linking mechanism and the linking mech-
7For airlines with only one ﬂight in some period, only the ﬁrst moment condition is required to hold.
17anismwithmoments canalsoberepresentedbyaparallelismfromeconometrics. Themaximum
likelihood estimator assumes that the whole underlying probability distribution is known, while
the method of moments matches only a set of empirical moments with theoretical ones. As
for their asymptotic properties, under speciﬁc conditions, both estimation procedures deliver
consistent estimates at the same rate of convergence (if n denotes the number of observations:
1 √
n).8 There are no general results on the small sample properties of these estimators. These
topics are still objects of research.
Decision problems in the linking mechanism are assumed to be independent, and major re-
sults are based on central limit theorems designed for the case of independent random variables.
However, a sufﬁciently large number of independent decision problems may be difﬁcult to ﬁnd.
The performance of the linking mechanism with correlated types could be an important topic
for future studies.
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